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The Nationalist movement was the crucible in which relations between Hindus and 
Muslims in British India took shape. It defined the period in which the concept of a 
monolithic “Muslim community” solidified and in which “Hindu” and “Muslim” 
interests were supposedly set in contrary positions. Any attempt to comment on the 
relationship between Hindus and Muslims in modern India has to take into account 
the history of communal relations in this period as the nationalist agitation against 
the British gathered force.  
 Recently Ashutosh Varshney published a work on Hindus and Muslims in 
India, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, that offered new insights into the nature of 
communal relations in modern India (Varshney 2002). Varshney analysed Hindu-
Muslim riots since 1947 and proposed a series of arguments to explain the reasons 
behind communal conflict in modern India. I do not intend to review his work, 
rather I want to test his hypothesis that strong civic linkages between Hindus and 
Muslims are the main barriers to communal conflict and provide the best processes 
for the mediation of such conflict when it occurs. Varshney examined a number of 
Indian cities for the period 1947-1990 and combined research on communal 
conflict during that period with forays into the histories of the various communities 
concerned to substantiate his claims. 
                                                 
1 Prof. McPherson was Mercator Professor (2002-2003) and is now Visiting Professor, 
Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg (e-mail: 
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Live Together? Hindus and Muslims in One State’, was presented at the Hans Seidel 
Stiftung seminar ‘Changing India’, in Wildbad Kreuth, Germany, 17-19 February 2003. My 
thanks to Professor Peter Reeves (National University of Singapore) and Professor Subrata 
Mitra, Peter Lehr, Clemens Spieß and Alexander Fischer of the South Asia Institute for 
their comments on drafts of this paper. 
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 Varshney’s conclusions are compelling, but he does concentrate on the present 
and recent past, at the expense of a more in-depth analysis of the history of the 
communities – especially the Muslim communities – he dealt with. By discounting 
history to the extent that he does he has missed arguments that would help 
substantiate his account of the present and explain more fully the root causes of 
communal discord rather than simply correlating current trends. For example, 
Varshney argues that “vigorous associational life” is a much more effective 
constraint on “the polarising strategies of political elites” and discounts the impact 
of “everyday forms of engagement” on lessening communal conflict (Varshney 
2002: 4). There are two obvious problems with these assertions. One is that it is 
debateable if elites always have a free hand in shaping communal relations, viz. the 
ability of Jinnah to undermine regional governments in the Punjab and Bengal 
where there had been impressive attempts to construct inter-communal accords and 
political parties. Another problem with this assertion is that “everyday forms of 
engagement” in an historical context occur in different social and cultural 
environments and consequently vary enormously in strength and ability to bolster 
communal accord. 
 In this paper I will take some of the themes raised by Varshney and apply them 
to the two Muslim communities with which I am familiar, and with whom 
Varshney does not deal. In the process I hope that I can use the discipline of history 
as a more efficient tool than Varshney does to explain the nature of communal 
relations and to emphasise that historical variations in Hindu-Muslim relations 
(particularly in the area of everyday engagement and civic interaction) provide 
clues to present variations in relations between the two communities. 
 Many commentators on Hindu-Muslim relations have treated both communities 
as monolithic and homogenous in terms of their aspirations. There have been 
attempts in recent years to challenge this monolithic view and to argue that it is 
fallacious and does little to help us understand the tensions, or absence of tensions, 
between Hindus and Muslims across British India. Some authors have argued that 
communal relations across British India varied enormously as did the historical, 
economic, linguistic, and cultural circumstances of the many communities of 
Hindus and Muslims that inhabited British India. As a result there is growing 
recognition that Hindu-Muslim relations were not uniform and that neither 
community was monolithic. In both the variety of inter-communal relations and the 
realities of major intra-communal differences there are undoubtedly lessons for all 
of us who attempt to plot the current state of communal relations in India (Assayag 
2004). 
 My introduction to the history of Islam in South Asia began with two studies of 
quite distinctive Muslim communities: one in southern India and the other in 
Calcutta (McPherson 1969, 1972). Both studies focussed on the evolution of 
Muslim communal consciousness and Muslim involvement in the various political 
movements that swept British India in the years between the First and Second 
World Wars. 
 Since then I have only occasionally revisited these communities (McPherson 
1980, 1984, 1990, 2001), but Varshney’s work – and an article by Amrita Basu on 
      KENNETH McPHERSON 
 
3 
communal riots in Bijnor between 1988 and 1992 (Basu 1997: 391-435) – revived 
my interest in the political history of Muslims in the sub-continent during the years 
of the nationalist struggle against the British. Varshney provided insights not only 
into my work but also into studies such as Basu’s in which the author based her 
examination of the state of communal relations in Bijnor on political and economic 
issues in the city to the exclusion of any analysis of the workings of inter-
communal civic life. 
The historical examples I will discuss operated in a different political context to 
that in which Varshney’s examples operated. My examples are set in the colonial 
environment and in a political situation shaped by separate electorates, the looming 
presence of a “third party” (the British), and the absence of a developed multi-party 
system. The political system itself was a potential source of communal conflict and 
rivalry. It collapsed in 1947, but arguably, despite the different political 
environments of pre- and post-independence India, many of the forces that shaped 
communal relations before 1947 are still at work. In parts of modern India Hindu-
Muslim relations have been shaped – and continue to be shaped – for the worse by 
the absence of vigorous inter-communal associational life and everyday forms of 
engagement. In other parts of India, however, it can be argued that communal 
relations were and are based on a vigorous inter-communal associational life and 
everyday forms of engagement which shaped – and continue to shape – a healthy 
inter-communal dialogue within the world’s largest democracy. 
 
 
C A L C U T T A  
 
In 1918, Calcutta had a population over 900,000 of whom nearly 25% were 
Muslims. Of all the cities of British India, Calcutta was undoubtedly the most 
cosmopolitan and was a microcosm of the complex ethnic and linguistic tapestry 
that was British India. It was above all a city of migrants in which the people and 
language of the surrounding province of Bengal had little impact. Most Hindus and 
Muslims in the city were from “up country” (Bihar, the United Provinces and the 
Punjab) and in some ways the city was both physically and linguistically a 
collective of discrete villages reflecting the diverse origins of its inhabitants.  
 The Muslims of Calcutta were drawn from all the major Muslim communities 
of the sub-continent ranging from Kutchi Memons to families of Persian origin. 
The majority of Muslims in the city came from Bihar and the United Provinces, 
spoke Urdu rather than Bengali, were poor and earned their living as artisans, 
labourers, hawkers, jute mill workers, petty merchants and chowkidars. Apart from 
the Muslim mill workers the majority were skilled artisans and workers who 
practiced their traditional crafts and trades in the city where they dominated the 
butchering, leatherwork, cigarette manufacturing, tailoring, and fruit selling trades 
and provided most of the manpower for cart and river transport as well as a 
significant proportion of the lascars recruited out of Calcutta. 
 Most Muslim mill workers were seasonal visitors to the city and lived as single 
men but the majority of Muslims lived in discrete communities scattered through 
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central Calcutta, cheek by jowl with Hindus with whom they had marginal social, 
linguistic and economic interaction. But this exclusion of Hindus was also 
extended to other Muslims. The Muslims of Calcutta were not a monolithic and 
homogenous community and were divided into a number of self-contained 
communities defined by place of origin and occupation. There were for example 
discrete communities made up of “Peshwari” fruit sellers, Bihari butchers, 
“Kabuli” moneylenders and Pathan leather dealers. The poorer, and numerically 
less significant, Bengali Muslims were originally drawn from a variety of rural 
castes – the Dhuma (cotton cleaners), Kulu (oil pressers), Kunja (vegetable sellers) 
and Joloha (weavers) – but in the city they tended to abandon caste names in 
favour of the title Sheikh. Outside their traditional occupations Muslims were 
poorly represented in government service and the professions except for the lower 
ranks of the police where the authorities favoured the recruitment of “tough” Bihari 
Muslim constables. 
 The leaders of these small communities were often more prosperous merchants 
and up-country labour recruitment organisers, serangs. Pre-eminent amongst such 
leaders were the wealthy Urdu-speaking mercantile families of Dawoodi Bohras, 
Cutchi Memons, Ranki and Qaum-I-Punjabian - who dominated the hide and skin 
trade and some of the bazaars of central Calcutta.2 Such families provided 
patronage for local associations of Muslims and funded the building of mosques 
and Urdu-medium schools. Most were Sunni Muslims and the city had few Shi’ites 
apart from some Bohra, Memon and Persian families. 
 There was no united community of Muslims in Calcutta in 1918. Muslims 
comprised many discrete groups, and most lived lives constrained by narrow 
geographic and linguistic loyalties. Even as late as 1970 it was claimed that there 
were more than 65 “ethnic groups” amongst the Muslims of Calcutta (Siddique 
1970).  
 
A u t h o r i t y  a n d  p o w e r  w i t h i n  M u s l i m  C a l c u t t a  
 
Authority and power within this fractured community was ill defined and 
fragmented. Some individuals exercised power because they were perceived to 
have the ear of the British who regarded them as the representatives of the entire 
Muslim community. As such they were the beneficiaries of the limited political 
changes introduced under the terms of the Minto-Morley reforms of 1909 which 
granted Muslims separate electorates. As a result of these reforms they became the 
spokesmen of Muslim interests in the provincial legislative council. These Muslim 
representatives were drawn from the Bengali-speaking mofussil landowning elite, 
and although they may have attracted the patronage of their rulers they were in fact 
separated from their Calcutta compatriots by a huge gulf of linguistic, historical 
and cultural differences that effectively circumscribed any substantial and lasting 
influence in the city. Associated with this group was a small but growing Western-
educated body of lawyers and other professionals. Many were related to the 
mofussil elite, but their world was far wider and they interacted with their Western-
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educated co-religionists across India and in Calcutta with Western-educated Hindu 
members of the professions. To a degree lifestyle, language and interests divided 
them from the mass of Muslims in Calcutta but they did possess a growing power 
and influence amongst their fellow Muslims through the exercise of their 
professional skills and by their increasing penetration of various organs of civil 
society ranging from the bureaucracy to education and India-wide political 
associations. Set apart from these two groups were more traditional leaders: Urdu-
speaking religious scholars and more prosperous merchants and artisans who 
exercised a broader popular authority based on their wealth and control of many of 
the organizations that underpinned Muslim life in Calcutta including a number of 
Urdu-language newspapers. These three leadership clusters co-existed in 1918 in 
an uneasy relationship that was to be tested in succeeding decades as the Muslims 
of Calcutta entered the political arena of Bengal and British India. 
 The British view of the nature of the provincial Muslim community was based 
on the almost equal division of the indigenous Bengali population between 
Muslims and Hindus and their belief that outside Calcutta leadership of the 
community was in the hands of a Muslim landholding elite. The British discounted 
the fragmented migrant Muslim communities of Calcutta and promoted men they 
believed best represented the profile of Bengal’s Muslims as the community’s 
spokesmen. Such men were drawn from several backgrounds: some were 
pensioned descendants of the last king of Oudh and Tipu Sultan; some were drawn 
from the Muslim landholding elite of the mofussil (rural areas) – the so-called 
ashraf families that claimed links with the Mughal past of Bengal – and others 
were members of the Bengali-speaking professional elite and were related to the 
ashraf families of the mofussil3. Only the Bengali Muslim professional elite was 
firmly based in Calcutta, the rest lived in but were not part of community or 
professional life in the city. Indeed, the ashraf, with their penchant for Arabic 
learning and their attachment to the Bengali and Persian languages, looked down 
on the immigrant Urdu Muslims of Calcutta. Whilst the Bengali Muslim 
professional elite was an integral part of the city in a way that the ashraf as a group 
were not, they were few in number and had no links with either the mass of Urdu 
Muslims or the small labouring class of Bengali Muslims in the mill and dock areas 
of Calcutta. In contrast to these relatively weak intra-communal links this group 
did have links with Muslims of similar background across British India and in their 
professional careers and daily life interacted with the Western-educated members 
of the Bengali Hindu bhadrolok. 
 By the end of World War I in 1918, a new community consciousness was 
emerging amongst the diverse Muslim communities of Calcutta. The decline of the 
Ottoman Empire as a result of the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars between 1911 
and 1913, as well as the Cawnpore mosque affair, stirred Muslims across India and 
prompted the first signs of widespread serious criticism of British rule amongst 
Muslims since 1857. Following the declaration of war between Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire in 1914 the fissures in Muslim loyalty to the British widened, and 
by 1918 the old loyalist leadership was discredited. There was a major communal 
                                                 
3 Hereafter referred to as Bengali Muslims. 
      KENNETH McPHERSON 
 
6 
riot in 1918 but on closer analysis it is clear that it began as a Muslim protest 
against the British that peripherally degenerated in some bazaars into a battle 
between Muslims and Marwaris who had long been locked in a dispute over 
korbani (cow slaughter). Within a few months the same Marwaris and Muslims 
joined together to attack the British in the riots that paralysed central Calcutta at the 
time of the agitation against the Rowlatt Act!  
 
A u t h o r i t y  a n d  P o w e r  T e s t e d  
 
During the War leading Urdu Muslim merchants in the city gradually and uneasily 
drew closer to the more radical members of the Bengali Muslim professional elite 
in growing opposition to British rule. From 1915, the Pan-Islamist Ali brothers and 
Annie Besant’s Home Rule League had assiduously worked to detach Muslims 
from their loyalty to the British. Their efforts were crowned by success when the 
Lucknow Pact was agreed upon in 1916. At Lucknow the Muslim League and the 
Indian National Congress agreed on a formula for Muslim representation in the 
various legislative bodies of British India. Peace in 1918, and the dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire did little to reconcile Muslim with their rulers and in this 
period of heightened tensions and expectations Gandhi emerged to refashion and 
refocus Indian nationalism. 
 Varshney gives Gandhi due credit for creating a huge range of civic institutions 
that brought the masses into political life and fashioned a new Hindu-Muslim 
accord. Whilst it cannot be denied that Gandhi created new processes and 
institutions relating to civic life in India the nexus between this activity and the 
“vigorous associational life” linking communities that Varshney argues are the 
bulwark against communal conflict is not clear to me. Gandhi took advantage of a 
Hindu-Muslim political accord that was already in the making and reinforced it by 
throwing the support of Congress behind the Khilafat movement that was designed 
to unite Hindus and Muslims in a struggle to protect what was left of the Ottoman 
Empire and the role of its ruler as the Khalif (spiritual leader) of Islam. The 
movement certainly captured the imagination of many Muslims and Hindus but it 
also collapsed in chaos when Gandhi halted Non-Co-Operation and Kemal Attaturk 
abolished the office of the Khalif, leaving little behind except mutual 
recriminations and bitterness. 
 The Khilafat movement and Gandhi left no legacy of associational activity 
between Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta. But the politicisation of the Muslim 
masses in the city during the accord between Khilfatists and Nationalists did 
encourage greater internal cohesion by weakening boundaries between various 
Muslim groups in the city and it also shattered the old triumvirate leadership. The 
landowning mofusil Muslim elite lost much influence because of its association 
with the British. Communal leadership was now in the hands of an uneasy alliance 
between the radicalised Muslim professional elite, which threw in its lot with the 
Khilafat agitation and the Nationalist movement, and the fervently pro-Khilafat 
merchants, artisans and ulema who controlled the mosques and Muslim bazaars 
and who commanded the loyalty of the majority of Muslims in the city. 
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 The Khilafat movement, however, was a political movement and had no 
parallel in the civic sphere where Muslims and Hindus in the city shared no 
associational activities. The failure of the Khilafat movement (and hence the failure 
of the Nationalist movement) to satisfy the concerns and aspirations of most of the 
Muslim’s of Calcutta represented a failure to provide any sustainable mechanism 
through which Muslims could negotiate and acquire some measure of power and 
authority in the city in cooperation with their non-Muslim compatriots. Following 
the collapse of the Khilafat movement and the Hindu-Muslim struggle against the 
British with Gandhi’s decision to end Non-Co-Operation the only point of regular 
contact and dialogue between leaders of the respective communities was the 
Calcutta Corporation. However, by the mid-1920s the Corporation had become an 
arena for Nationalist politics as much as for civic government limiting the ability of 
Muslims in Calcutta to utilise it as an effective arena in which to create a dialogue 
with other communities living in the city. An alternative forum was the provincial 
government where the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1921 provided for greater 
representation of Indians in provincial government. But here too the Muslim 
representatives from Calcutta found themselves isolated by the maelstrom of 
nationalist in fighting. Elsewhere in business, education, welfare activity and 
unionism the divide between Hindu and Muslim in Calcutta was as great as ever 
and there existed virtually no reservoir of what Varshney calls “social familiarity” 
that may have helped mediate differences between the two communities (Varshney 
2002: 14-15). The absence of such mediating mechanisms was highlighted by the 
savage communal riots of 1926 that spread over 6 months. Gangs, recruited by 
local politicians, and petty merchants and tradesmen (from both major 
communities), inaugurated horrible riots in the central bazaars of the city that 
buried the vestiges of any communal rapprochement. The evolution of power based 
on patronage made inter-community links even harder to sustain. 
 
A u t h o r i t y  a n d  P o w e r  F r a g m e n t e d  
 
Between 1926 and Partition and Independence in 1947 little changed in relations 
between Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta. The Bengali Muslim professional elite 
under Faz-ul Huq did attempt to rally the Muslim and Hindu peasantry in a united 
front against the exactions of the landlord class. However, Congress in Bengal was 
dominated by the Hindu landowning elite and the attempt by Huq to create a supra 
communal political party – the Bengal Praja Party – to push for land ownership and 
tenancy reform was doomed by the opposition of the provincial Congress and the 
ashraf aristocracy in the mofussil, and the indifference of the Urdu Muslims of 
Calcutta to the issues he championed. 
 Within the Calcutta Muslim community the years between 1926 and 1947 were 
marked by petty political squabbling that masked an increasing isolation from other 
communities in the city. In the Corporation, thoroughly politicised by Congress 
from the mid 1920s - despite attempts by the local Congress leader (C. R. Das) to 
broker an accord in 1923 – there was little evidence of cooperation between the 
two communities essentially because what was ostensibly the supreme civic 
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organization had become a political arena devoid of politicians capable of 
constructing inter-communal networks.  
 The failure of Muslims and Hindus to cooperate in the Corporation was 
reflected at an organisational level elsewhere in Calcutta. In 1932, for example, 
Muslim merchants feeling excluded from the existing three major commercial 
organizations in the city formed their own association, the Muslim Chamber of 
Commerce. Three years later, Muslim lascars broke with the National Trade Union 
Federation and formed their own union. The motives behind both these moves 
were due to feelings of alienation and the carrot of separate political representation 
for Muslim commercial and lascar interests that was dangled before the community 
by the British in the lead up to the reformed constitution promised for 1935. 
 During these years, at least until the Great Killings of 1946 which preceded 
Partition, whilst the level of communal violence remained low it was consistent 
with small-scale riots, looting, petty larceny and murder in the bazaars of central 
Calcutta. 
 Calcutta prior to independence was a disaster zone for communal relations. In 
terms of robust inter-communal civic life and everyday association it was a desert 
and was a battlefield between various narratives that defined the different 
communities living in the city. To an extent the nature of the inter-communal 
dialogue was determined, as Varshney has hypothesised for the post-1947 period, 
by an absence of vigorous inter-communal civic and associational life. But it was 
also determined by the tides of the nationalist movement as it took shape in Bengal, 
and by events at the national level where Congress and the All India Muslim 
League were rivals for Muslim support. Local elites were pulled in a variety of 
directions dictated by local self-interest and the pressures of the wider nationalist 
struggle. Varshney has claimed that vigorous associational life is the best constraint 
on “the polarising strategies of political elites” but this claim is based on an 
assumption that such elites have a free hand. In Calcutta and Bengal one could 
argue that economic and class interests and external pressures from the national 
leadership of both the League and Congress constrained the freedom of movement 
on the part of local elites and reinforced the appeal of conflicting community 
narratives. 
 In the instance of the Muslims of Calcutta there was a master narrative based 
on the north Indian model of the respectable Muslim being Urdu-speaking and 
linked to the Mughal past that was not only in conflict with the dominant regional 
narrative of the Hindu landowning elite based on its position as the major 
landowning group, but was also initially at odds with the Muslim regional 
narratives. One of these narratives was that of the Bengali Muslim professional 
group led by men such as Fazl-ul Huq who attempted to build a political bridge 
between the two communities outside Calcutta based on a commonality of interests 
between the Hindu and Muslim peasantry and small landowner. The opposing 
Bengali Muslim narrative, which initially was unsympathetic to the Urdu Muslims, 
was the elitist narrative of the landowning Bengali ashraf. Originally it was not a 
narrative that linked the Muslims of the city with the Muslims of the mofussil, but 
as ashraf fears of Congress grew they made concerted attempts to build links with 
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the Urdu Muslims of Calcutta preaching from an overtly communalist and 
exclusive platform. The tragedy of the failure of Fazl-ul Huq to build a supra-
communal narrative was that the failure left a vacuum which in the absence of 
initiatives from either community led to the eclipse of rational choice and the 
disastrous breakdown in communal relations resulting in the dismemberment of 
Bengal into Hindu and Muslim majority areas in 1947.4  Bereft of any alternative 
courses of action the Muslims of Calcutta were fertile ground for Jinnah and his 
supporters from the late 1930s when they concentrated their efforts to win 
community-wide support for the All India Muslim League by urging the creation of 
separate Muslim civil society institutions. It was a campaign that helped seal the 
communal divide and further undermined Fazl-ul Huq’s attempts to create a supra-
communal political forum resulting in the tragedies of 1946 and 1947 for the 
Muslims of the city. 
 The failure of political alternatives and the equally disastrous failure to create 
voluntary inter-communal networks in Calcutta and between Calcutta and the 
mofussil was compounded by the absence of what Varshney has called “short term 
associational networks”, i.e. everyday forms of engagement, between Hindus and 
Muslim throughout the city (Varshney 2002: x, 4,11). The end result was an almost 
total collapse of civil engagement from the 1930s that prefaced Partition in 1947. 
 Perhaps the spirit of the Calcutta in the years before (and sadly after) 1947 is in 
part summed up by a writer in 1966 who noted that 
 
Calcutta does not enjoy that easy and widespread social 
communication necessary to foster the organization of a well-knit 
society of people having a civic consciousness. The lack of 
assimilation makes Calcutta not a melting pot but a tossed salad, and 
the city’s life seethes with tensions between non-communicating 
groups […] (Ali 1966: 18). 
 
Undoubtedly this comment is harsh and inaccurate (and oddly “Orientalist”) in that 
it implies a character failure not unlike the supine and effeminate character the 
colonial British attributed to the Hindus or their characterisation of Muslims as 
warlike and surly. But, Calcutta was not “a well-knit society”. It was a city and 
society buffeted and divided by competing political, cultural and economic 
interests which collectively undermined all attempts between 1918 and 1947 to 
create mechanisms for inter-communal dialogue and cooperation. 
 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of rational choice and civic life see Mitra (1999). 
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M A D R A S  
 
In many ways Madras was a very different city from Calcutta. It had a smaller 
population and a smaller percentage of Muslims reflecting the fact that province 
wide Muslims formed only 7% of the population although they comprised 10% of 
the population of Madras city which stood at more than 520,000 in 1921. It had a 
major cotton textile industry, but compared with Calcutta was a much less 
significant commercial centre. However, in the context of southern India, Madras 
was the great metropolis: not only was it the administrative centre of the Madras 
Presidency, which included much of southern and central India, but it was also the 
storm centre of the nationalist movement south of Bombay. It was a city of major 
educational and cultural institutions, with a vibrant vernacular and English-
language press and was magnet that attracted migrants from across southern and 
central British India.   
 Within the city Muslim institutions, apart from mosques and religious 
endowments, were neither numerous nor strong. Urdu-speaking Muslims formed 
the majority of the population but they were relatively impoverished comprising 
mostly petty merchants and artisans. Fewer in number, but wealthier and more 
integrated into the economic life of the city was a growing community of Tamil-
speaking Muslims with strong organisational and religious links to other Tamil-
speaking communities across the Tamil heartland of southeast India.5 
 
A u t h o r i t y  a n d  P o w e r  w i t h  t h e  M a d r a s  M u s l i m  C o m m u n i t y  
 
On the eve of the First World War the profile of communal leadership was 
superficially similar to that of Calcutta. The British recruited scions of the old Urdu 
Muslim aristocracy of the Carnatic and Mysore – principally from the family of the 
Prince of Arcot – along with a few landowners and prominent merchants from the 
same linguistic and cultural milieu, as spokesmen of Muslim interests both before 
and after the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909. The Muslim population of the city 
was also superficially similar to that of Calcutta comprising mainly Sunni Urdu-
speakers who had moved south with Muslim invaders from the Deccan Sultanates 
and the Mughal Empire with a scattering of Gujarati and Persian Shia Muslim 
merchant families. Most Muslims were engaged in either trade or in small family 
industries and lived in a concentrated area around the Wallajah mosque and the 
palace of the Prince of Arcot quite separate from the Hindu heartland of the city. 
Wealthy merchant families provided the main source of patronage for community 
focal points such as mosques, schools and a small number of cultural and political 
organizations such various anjumans and the tiny local branch of the All-India 
Muslim League. A smaller number of Muslims were Tamil-speakers who had 
migrated to the city from southern Tamil-speaking districts such as Madurai, 
Tiruchirapali and Salem. 
                                                 
5 Hereafter referred to as either Urdu or Tamil Muslims. 
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 The image of Madras as a Muslim migrant city similar to Calcutta can however 
be overdrawn. Below the level of elite leadership imposed by the British the 
community was tightly knit and led by a number of wealthy merchant families the 
most prosperous of whom dominated the flourishing local skin and hide trade 
which fed into the large European-owned tannery industry. In addition to these 
families there was a small coterie of Tamil Muslim merchant families, some of 
whom were also engaged in the skin and hide trade, who were the de facto 
spokesmen for that community of Muslims. Relations between Urdu and Tamil 
Muslims were not close. The Urdu Muslims regarded their Tamil co-religionists as 
somewhat heterodox, but business links did provide a nexus between the two 
groups as it did with Hindu business groups throughout the city. 
 The Tamil Muslims were an ancient community pre-dating the eleventh 
century Muslim invasions of northern India. They were descended from Arab and 
Persian merchants who intermarried locally and from converts. For a millennia or 
more they were merchants who created a maritime trading network linking the 
Tamil heartland with Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, and socially were organised 
into endogamous “caste-like” groups. The Tamil Muslim leadership was essentially 
politically cautious and in addition readily identified with the history and language 
of Tamil south India. The community had strong and ancient links to their Hindu 
counterparts as well as a keen sense of being an organic part of the larger Tamil 
community. Islam had deep roots in the Tamil countryside with its own complex 
local sacred landscape and identity that provided a strong network of integrated 
religious, business and civic organizations based on endogamous groups such as 
the Marakayyars, Labbais and Navayats (Bayly 1989). The everyday language of 
the community was Tamil, which along with Arabic was also the language of 
religion. Urdu and Persian, the languages of north Indian Muslims were not part of 
Tamil Muslim daily or religious life, despite attempts by some north Indian 
Muslim organizations to foster the spread of Urdu amongst them in the early 
twentieth century. Whilst the Tamil Muslims were the smallest linguistic group of 
Muslims in the Madras Presidency, barely 600,000 compared with more than 
1,100,000 Urdu Muslims and nearly 1,000,000 Mapillas (Malayalam-speaking 
Muslim from what is now Kerala), they were concentrated in the Tamil-speaking 
mofussil where they formed the dominant Muslim group. In these districts they 
comprised 5% of the population but in urban centres such as Nagore, Nagapattinam 
and Kayalam they were considerably better represented.  
 In the years immediately preceding World War I, the Urdu Muslims of Madras 
like their co-religionists in Calcutta were stirred to increasing resentment against 
the British by events in North Africa and the Balkans from 1911, as well as by the 
Cawnpore Mosque affair. Urdu Muslims in Madras were active in establishing 
local chapters of the Red Crescent Society to assist Turks in the Balkans and there 
was a groundswell of anger and alienation from the British amongst them which 
increased in intensity following the declaration of war between the British and 
Ottoman empires in 1914. Their anger was harnessed by leaders of the Nationalist 
movement, in particular by the local Home Rule League and – in contrast to 
Calcutta – by all leading local Congress leaders who actively supported the 
      KENNETH McPHERSON 
 
12 
Lucknow Pact. The lead for this agitation within the Muslim community was 
provided by supporters of the two major communal organisations in the city – the 
Madras Presidency Muslim League and the Southern Indian Muhammedan 
Educational Association: both founded with the active encouragement of parent 
organizations in northern India. Both were overwhelmingly Urdu Muslim in 
orientation and had little impact amongst Tamil Muslims. 
 Initially the Tamil Muslims were largely unmoved by the rise of north Indian 
inspired communal organisations and agitation. But during the course of the First 
World War economic grievances and growing concern for the fate of the Khalif 
moved the Tamil Muslim leadership towards a more critical view of British rule 
and a greater intimacy with their Urdu-speaking coreligionists. 
 
A u t h o r i t y  a n d  P o w e r  T e s t e d  
 
As in Calcutta, the first leadership victims in the turmoil following the end of 
World War I were many of the old conservative spokesmen sponsored and trusted 
by the British. Most of these victims were related to either the Prince of Arcot or 
were descended from the few mofussil landowning families in the Presidency. The 
merchant members of this group, with their active and dominant role in community 
life, fared better and some reappeared as community spokesmen for various 
political factions in the post-War years. Overall leadership in the community 
immediately following the end of the War was divided between various claimants. 
One centre of power and authority comprised leading Urdu-speaking merchant 
families; another a small group of Western-educated professionals who had gained 
some influence in the years immediately before and during the War both as a result 
of patronage by leading Urdu-speaking merchant families and as a result of the 
links they maintained with their peers elsewhere in British India (McPherson 1970, 
32-47). They were in effect the Urdu-speakers’ communication link with the 
outside world, but they trod a difficult path caught between the innate political 
caution of the merchant elite and the siren call of the political storm gathering 
across the sub-continent. A third leadership group comprised leading Tamil 
Muslim merchants who whilst as politically cautious as their Urdu-speaking co-
religionists had closer social and economic links with their Tamil-speaking 
compatriots across southern India. 
 Superficially there were parallels between the exercise of power and authority 
of the Muslim communities of Calcutta and Madras but, in stark contrast to 
Calcutta, not only did local Hindu Congressmen move to build political links to 
Muslim leadership groups, but also the Muslim mercantile elite of the city joined 
with their Hindu counterparts to support agitation against the British. The wealthy 
Muslim skin and hide traders were badly affected by wartime regulations that 
banned the export of skins and hides and which consequently lowered their market 
price. In contrast European-owned tanneries in Madras benefited from this move. 
In 1917, in an attempt to agitate for the reform of these regulations Muslim skin 
and hide traders – Urdu- and Tamil-speaking – formed their own association, the 
Southern Indian Skin and Hide Merchants’ Association, and became even more 
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active in the inter-communal Southern India Chamber of Commerce (established in 
1909). Both these associations threw their support behind the Home Rule League, 
the Lucknow Pact and later Gandhi. Such business associations provided the type 
of vigorous inter-communal civic organization that was so patently absent in 
Calcutta. 
 In Madras Gandhi inherited and consolidated a thriving communal accord. As 
in Calcutta, the accord was badly affected by the failure of the Khilafat and Non-
Co-Operation movements and by the lure of the political concessions offered by 
the British under the terms of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, but the future of 
communal relations was markedly different. 
 The heightening of Muslim political consciousness led to the eclipse of the 
much of the old elite leadership and from 1918 the community was lead almost 
exclusively by groups of wealthy merchants. Like the Muslim leadership of post-
War Calcutta, the Muslim leadership of Madras was factionalised. But whereas in 
Calcutta the factions were united in their opposition to Congress and the supra-
communal politics of Faz-ul Huq, in Madras the position was far more complex. 
 
P o w e r  a n d  A u t h o r i t y  D i v i d e d ?  
 
In part the complexity of Muslim political decision-making in Madras and the 
emergence of new leadership groups and new types of power and authority was 
due to the growing influence of Tamil Muslims in Madras city. In part it was also 
related to the particular political milieu of the Madras Presidency where the 
political dialogue within the Hindu community was divided between the Indian 
National Congress and the Justice Party with its narrative of a popular Tamil 
challenge to Brahmin domination. Unlike Calcutta, the post-War period in Madras 
provided Muslims with a number of apparently viable alternatives for dialogue 
with other communities and for opportunities to create new dialogues through a 
number of civil society institutions to protect and further their interests. 
 Between 1918 and 1921, when Gandhi’s programme for Non-Co-Operation 
and the Khilafat movement collapsed, Urdu- and Tamil-speaking Muslims in 
Madras were active participants in these movements. Merchant caution may have 
tempered the support of many of the community’s leaders but local Nationalist 
leaders were keen to retain their support and actively sought to conciliate waverers 
and promote local economic interests. 
 However, apart from the Indian National Congress and its offshoot the 
provincial Swaraj Party (established to contest elections under the 1921 reforms), 
the Justice Party provided another platform for Hindu-Muslim political cooperation 
particularly after the constitutional reforms that ushered in dyarchy in 1921. In the 
1920s and into the mid-1930s both the Justice and Swaraj Parties were rivals for 
Muslim support. For many Muslims, however, the Swaraj Party was tainted with 
memories of the Non-Co-Operation fiasco whereas the Justice Party provided an 
alternative and more cautious forum in which communal concerns could be 
negotiated within the constitutional process. Support for the Justice Party was 
particularly forthcoming from Tamil Muslims who whilst critical of the British 
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had, for the most part, found Gandhi’s brand of nationalism and agitation too 
extreme. Some remained in the Congress fold but others were more comfortable 
with the constitutionalist and anti-Brahmin approach of the non-Brahmin Justice 
Party which evolved out of the South Indian Liberal Federation. The Federation 
was formed in 1917 and was the first overt sign of the struggle between Brahmin 
and non-Brahmin that was to shape Tamil politics for the rest of the century. 
Ironically the Justice Party also attracted the support of some of the younger 
members of the old pro-British elite in Madras city that had been eclipsed during 
the war years. For them it provided a route into the constitutional political arena 
where they could renew their opposition to the Brahmin-dominated Nationalist 
movement and negotiate their interests through cooperation with non-Brahmin 
Hindus. 
 Whilst the Muslim mercantile leadership in Madras city was divided primarily 
between supporters of the Justice Party and Congress, links were maintained by 
shared business interests both with one another and through strong inter-communal 
business organizations. Also, the Congress-Justice Party divide did not reflect the 
Urdu- and Tamil-speaking divide within the Muslim community, but rather 
reflected the divide between politically cautious Muslims and Congress-oriented 
Muslim nationalists. Urdu and Tamil Muslims were found on both sides of this 
divide. In addition some Muslims in the city were keen supporters of the many 
north Indian Muslim-inspired political groups and parties that flourished in the 
1920s and 1930s, but in general both Congress and the Justice party were 
successful in maintaining meaningful political links with the majority of Muslim 
leaders. The Tamil Muslim leadership in the city may have been for the most part 
more politically conservative than their pro-Congress co-religionists, but 
nevertheless they identified closely with the broad Tamil cultural and historical 
environment and were not alienated from the larger Hindu community as were their 
co-religionists in Calcutta.  
 Unlike Calcutta, Madras city was spared major outbreaks of communal 
violence although there were many instances in which Muslim spokesmen from 
both major political factions felt aggrieved and betrayed by their Hindu partners. 
To paraphrase Varshney, civic links and vigorous associational life acted as serious 
constraints on the polarising strategies of more intransigent communal spokesmen 
on both sides of the communal divide (Varshney 2002: 4). 
 By the 1930s, the Justice Party was in terminal decline and the Tamil Muslim 
leadership was increasingly politically isolated.6 Some leaders drifted towards 
Congress whilst others adopted a middle path. All rejected the overtures of more 
communalist spokesmen within the south and from north India, and in the late 
1930s when Jinnah courted them and revived the All India Muslim League they 
gave guarded support on the basis of the need for Muslims to catch up with Hindus 
in the areas of education and government employment. The Muslim League also 
courted the Urdu Muslim leadership and to an extent its efforts were successful in 
that a significant number of leaders from both Muslim groups gave their support to 
                                                 
6 For the evolution of the rump of the Justice Party into the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) and 
later the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and its successors see Price 1996: 359-83. 
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a broadly based Muslim Parliamentary Board that fought the 1937 election on 
purely local issues that had been the subject of keen debate for decades. Between 
1937 and 1947, the Muslim leadership supported Jinnah and the Muslim League 
largely because the national leadership of Congress seemed set against negotiations 
with the Muslim League. But that support co-existed with their on-going vigorous 
associational and civic links with the Hindu majority and local Congress leaders 
such as C.R. Rajagopalachariar. Partition was not ushered in by the horrors that 
scarred Calcutta or by mass migration. A handful of Muslims left for Pakistan, for 
the rest it was essentially business as usual. 
 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
In terms of Varshney’s emphasis on vigorous associational and civic lives as the 
major bulwarks against communal violence and alienation Calcutta and Madras 
stand in stark contrast to one another.  
 The Hindu and Muslim communities in Calcutta shared little in terms of the 
daily and civic lives and were led by politicians with little will to develop links 
between the communities. Faz-ul Huq stands out as the outstanding exponent of 
inter-communal political cooperation but he had little support from either 
community in the city and in the mofussil was checkmated by the opposition of the 
Hindu and Muslim landowning elite. Even at the level of day-to-day links there 
was marginal inter-communal contact in the city given the massive social, cultural, 
linguistic and economic dislocation that existed between the many Muslim and 
Hindu communities comprising the city’s population. The various narratives that 
defined communities in the city were essentially isolationist and exclusive, and 
they undermined the possibilities for rational choice in terms of communal 
harmony and cooperation. 
 In Madras on the other hand vigorous associational life flourished. At one level 
it was based on closely integrated business interests, on the other it derived from 
the historical niche that Tamil Muslims occupied in the region. Strong associational 
and civic links encouraged Muslim and Hindu political leaders to promote strong 
political links and undermined the appeal of overtly confessional political parties. 
Historically such links pre-dated the emergence of Gandhi in the 1920s. The inter-
communal links that operated so positively in Madras were in place before Gandhi 
emerged to national leadership, and there is no evidence that the Nationalists 
created these links in either Calcutta or Madras, although in the latter city they 
certainly encouraged and supported them. It could even be argued that Congress in 
Bengal, and the Muslim rural landowning elite, acted to undermine the 
development of political and associational links in contrast to politicians across the 
broader political spectrum in Madras. 
 Varshney’s work certainly has something to tell us about the path forward in 
India and the work that needs to be undertaken to ensure that both Muslims and 
Hindus share the benefits of Indian nationhood. But the variety of Islam in India 
and the close regional associations of the majority of Muslims need to be explored 
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further if we wish to obtain a better understanding of the integral part that Muslims 
have and continue to play in the life of the country and the nature of communal 
relations. Whilst Varshney has furthered our understanding of inter-communal 
relations across India I think his hypothesis essentially addresses correlations rather 
than causality. His short-term view underestimates the impact of the past in terms 
of the nature of daily interactions between the communities and the constraints 
imposed on followers and leaders by their economic and class interests, and by the 
different narratives by which they define themselves. 
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